What Influences Police Chiefs and Sheriffs to Support Civilian Oversight Boards?

This study investigates whether U.S. police executives’ support for civilian review boards (CRBs) can be influenced by public opinion or peer agency adoption. Using a pre-registered survey experiment of 1,331 municipal police chiefs and sheriffs, researchers tested the effects of state-level public support and elite peer adoption on attitudes toward CRBs. The findings show that elite peer adoption increased support for CRBs by 0.18 to 0.24 standard deviations, while public opinion had smaller, selective effects. Sheriffs and Republican-affiliated executives were notably less supportive. Results suggest peer influence is more effective than public pressure in shifting executive support for oversight reforms.

Full Citation and Link to Article

Adams, I. T., McCrain, J., Schiff, D. S., Schiff, K. J., & Mourtgos, S. M. (2025). Police reform from the top down: Experimental evidence on police executive support for civilian oversight. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 44(2), 403–427. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22620

Extended Summary

Central Research Question

This study investigates a crucial yet underexplored question: Can police executives’ support for civilian oversight mechanisms—specifically civilian review boards (CRBs)—be influenced by information about public support or peer agency adoption? Given the role of police executives in shaping departmental policy and their gatekeeping function over reforms, understanding what factors influence their stance on oversight is vital. The study centers on two key potential drivers of support: state-level public opinion and evidence of CRB adoption by major policing agencies.

Previous Literature

While the public and policymakers frequently debate police reform and accountability, much of the academic literature has focused on street-level officers rather than top leadership. Previous research has shown that civilian oversight boards, which allow community members to investigate or discipline officers, are widely supported by the public. However, fewer than 200 of the approximately 18,000 U.S. police departments currently have CRBs, suggesting substantial institutional resistance.

Scholars have proposed that police executives play an essential intermediary role between the public, political actors, and the police force. These executives may respond to pressures from city managers, unions, or professional associations. The literature has also explored two theories relevant to this study. First, the “public influence hypothesis” posits that police leaders will be more supportive of oversight when public support is high. Second, the “elite diffusion hypothesis” suggests that police executives may be more responsive to peer behavior—such as CRB adoption in large agencies—through mechanisms of policy learning or imitation. Prior evidence shows that policy diffusion among elite networks can powerfully shape law enforcement practices, including adoption of crime mapping, body-worn cameras, and accreditation standards.

Data

The authors conducted a pre-registered survey experiment with 1,331 police executives (chiefs and sheriffs), drawn from a population of over 13,000 municipal police departments and sheriff’s offices with at least one sworn officer and a listed email address. The survey was conducted between February 1 and March 7, 2022. The sample is representative in terms of demographics, agency size, and geography.

To inform the experimental treatments, the authors also fielded an original public opinion survey of 16,840 adults across all U.S. states, measuring support for CRBs with investigatory and disciplinary powers. These estimates were calculated at the state level and, using multilevel regression with post-stratification (MrP), at the county level as well.

The police executive sample was predominately white (88%), male (over 90%), and experienced (average of 30 years in law enforcement and 7 years in their current position). About 56% oversaw agencies with fewer than 25 officers. Thirty-three percent had master’s degrees and another third held bachelor’s degrees. The sample included both appointed municipal police chiefs and elected county sheriffs, allowing comparisons between these leadership roles.

Methods

The experiment randomly assigned police executives to one of four groups: a control group or one of three treatment groups. Each treatment group received information designed to influence views about CRBs:

1. Public Support CRB: State-level public support for CRBs with investigatory power only.

2. Public Support CRB + Firing: State-level public support for CRBs with both investigatory and disciplinary power.

3. Elite Peer Adoption: Information that over 60% of large city police departments (as surveyed by the DOJ’s Community Oriented Policing Services) have CRBs with investigatory powers.

After receiving their assigned treatment (or none in the control group), respondents answered questions measuring three types of outcomes:

• Their general feelings toward CRBs (on a 5-point Likert scale).

• Whether they would support a CRB in their own agency (yes/no).

• Which powers they believed were appropriate for a CRB, including investigative authority, subpoena power, and disciplinary functions.

The authors used regression analysis with covariates such as position (chief or sheriff), partisanship, agency size, and current CRB status to estimate treatment effects. Outcomes were standardized for comparison.

Findings/Size Effects

The primary finding is that police executives are significantly more responsive to peer adoption of CRBs than to state-level public opinion, even when that opinion reflects strong public support. The Elite Peer Adoption treatment had the most consistent and sizable effects:

• It increased positive feelings toward CRBs by 0.18 standard deviations.

• It increased willingness to support establishing a CRB by 0.16 standard deviations (p < 0.1).

• It increased support for more expansive CRB powers by 0.24 standard deviations.

By contrast, the Public Support CRB treatments had weaker and more selective effects:

• Public opinion data for CRBs with investigatory power alone had no significant effect on general attitudes or support for adoption but increased support for more CRB powers by 0.18 standard deviations (p < 0.05).

• Public opinion data for CRBs with disciplinary power also had no effect on attitudes or support for adoption, but it significantly increased support for CRB powers by 0.30 standard deviations (p < 0.001).

Thus, while public opinion did not shift overall attitudes or willingness to establish a CRB, it did increase the number of powers executives believed should be granted to CRBs—especially when disciplinary powers were included.

Additional subgroup findings reveal significant heterogeneity:

• Sheriffs were less supportive of CRBs overall and less responsive to all treatments.

• Executives from agencies with existing CRBs were significantly more supportive, suggesting either self-selection or experiential learning.

• Republicans and independents were notably less supportive of CRBs than Democrats, across all outcome measures. For example, being Republican was associated with a 0.43 standard deviation lower feeling toward CRBs.

• Larger agencies were more likely to support CRBs, especially those with 500 or more officers.

The study also explored which specific powers gained support. The Elite Peer Adoption treatment significantly increased support for powers such as investigating complaints (+12 percentage points), hearing citizen appeals (+17 points), and hearing officer appeals (+12 points). The public opinion treatments also increased support for these and other powers, though to a lesser extent.

Conclusion

This study provides the most comprehensive experimental evidence to date on police executive support for civilian oversight. The central finding is that elite peer behavior, not public opinion, is the most effective lever for increasing support for CRBs among police leaders. While the public overwhelmingly favors civilian oversight, executives are only modestly influenced by these preferences, and even then, only in terms of increasing the powers they believe CRBs should have.

The results suggest that reform advocates may be more successful by promoting horizontal diffusion strategies—highlighting CRB adoption in peer agencies—rather than relying on public opinion pressure. In short, what other chiefs and sheriffs are doing matters more than what the public wants.

At the same time, the partial responsiveness to public opinion, especially regarding CRB powers, indicates that public sentiment may play a secondary role in shaping reform debates. The study also highlights the need for further research on the role of police executives in policy learning and the diffusion of democratic reforms within law enforcement.

These findings have implications for policymakers, reformers, and scholars alike. To make meaningful progress on police oversight, reform strategies must consider the institutional and social networks that shape executive attitudes, rather than relying solely on bottom-up public pressure.