Does Greater School Competition Lead Parents to Complain Less?

Hensvik and Jävervall (2024) ask whether increased school competition reduces parental “voice,” measured through formal complaints about schools. They analyze administrative complaint data from Sweden’s national education authorities and link it to changes in local school competition following the expansion of independent schools under the voucher system. They find that greater competition is associated with fewer parental complaints to regulators. A one–standard deviation increase in local school competition reduces complaint rates by roughly 7–10 percent. They interpret this pattern as evidence that when parents have more exit options—switching schools—they rely less on voice mechanisms such as filing complaints with authorities.

Why This Article Was Selected for The Policy Scientist

Research on school choice has long focused on academic outcomes, yet far less attention has been given to how competition changes the way parents interact with public institutions. Hensvik and Jävervall (2024) address this broader institutional question by examining whether increased school competition reduces the use of parental “voice,” an idea rooted in Albert Hirschman’s influential exit–voice framework. The topic is timely as many education systems continue to expand choice-based reforms and quasi-markets in public services. The authors have contributed repeatedly to the literature on labor markets and education, and this article extends that body of work into the governance consequences of competition. Using detailed Swedish administrative complaint records, the study relies on a large, credible dataset that provides unusually direct evidence on parental engagement. Sweden’s institutional setting differs from many jurisdictions, but the underlying mechanism—parents substituting exit for voice—likely applies broadly where school choice expands. The statistical approach is careful and transparent, though it relies primarily on observational regression strategies rather than stronger causal identification. Future work using quasi-experimental designs or randomized interventions would further strengthen causal inference in this emerging area of research.

Full Citation and Link to Article

Sebhatu, A., Wennberg, K., Lakomaa, E., & Brandén, M. (2026). Competition and voice in public education: Evidence from Sweden. Education Finance and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1162/edfp.a.439

Central Research Question

The expansion of school choice and competition has reshaped education systems in many countries over the past three decades. Most empirical research in this area has examined academic outcomes, such as student achievement, graduation rates, or school productivity. Far less attention has been devoted to how competition alters the relationship between citizens and public institutions. Sebhatu, Wennberg, Lakomaa, and Brandén examine this institutional dimension by asking whether increased school competition affects parental “voice” in public education systems. The concept of voice originates from Albert Hirschman’s well-known framework distinguishing between “exit” (leaving an organization) and “voice” (attempting to improve it through complaints or advocacy). In the context of schooling, exit occurs when parents move their children to alternative schools, while voice occurs when they formally complain about school quality or behavior to regulatory authorities.

The authors investigate whether the expansion of school competition in Sweden—driven by the growth of independent schools under a voucher system—changes the extent to which parents rely on voice mechanisms. Specifically, the article asks whether increased competitive pressure reduces the frequency of formal parental complaints submitted to national education authorities. This question is theoretically important because market-oriented reforms may alter not only performance outcomes but also the mechanisms through which citizens interact with public institutions. If competition encourages exit while discouraging voice, the accountability structure of public education may shift in ways that have received little empirical scrutiny.

Previous Literature

The article builds on two distinct strands of literature. The first concerns Hirschman’s exit–voice framework, which has been widely applied to political economy, organizational behavior, and public services. In this framework, dissatisfied consumers or citizens can either exit a service provider or remain and attempt to improve performance through voice. The theoretical relationship between these two responses remains contested. Some scholars argue that exit reduces incentives for voice because dissatisfied individuals can simply leave rather than attempt to reform the organization. Others contend that competition may increase voice by raising expectations and encouraging users to demand higher quality.

The second strand of literature concerns school choice and competition in education systems. A large empirical literature—particularly in the United States and Europe—has examined whether charter schools, vouchers, or independent schools improve student achievement. These studies frequently focus on competitive spillovers, asking whether the presence of alternative schools improves outcomes in nearby public schools. The Swedish school choice reform of the early 1990s has been especially influential in this literature because it created one of the most comprehensive voucher-based systems in the world. Numerous studies have examined its effects on test scores, segregation, and school performance.

However, far fewer studies have examined how competition affects parental engagement or institutional accountability mechanisms. Complaints to regulators represent one such mechanism. They provide a formal channel through which parents can report concerns about school practices, treatment of students, or quality of instruction. By examining complaint behavior, the authors extend the literature beyond performance outcomes and into the governance consequences of competition. The article therefore connects the exit–voice framework with empirical research on education markets, providing a new perspective on how competitive reforms reshape interactions between citizens and public authorities.

Data

The authors rely on detailed administrative data from Sweden’s national education oversight system. In Sweden, parents can file formal complaints about schools with the Swedish Schools Inspectorate and other regulatory authorities. These complaints are recorded in administrative databases that document the timing, location, and subject of each complaint. The dataset provides a direct measure of parental voice within the education system, allowing the authors to observe how complaint behavior varies across municipalities and over time.

The complaint data are combined with information on school competition. Competition is measured using the presence and expansion of independent schools operating under Sweden’s voucher system. Independent schools receive public funding but operate outside traditional municipal governance structures. Their expansion has significantly increased the range of schooling options available to parents. By tracking the growth of these schools across municipalities, the authors construct measures of local competitive pressure.

The dataset also incorporates demographic and institutional variables describing municipalities and school systems. These variables allow the authors to control for differences in population characteristics, socioeconomic conditions, and educational environments. The resulting dataset spans multiple years and covers the entire country, providing broad geographic and temporal coverage. Administrative data of this type offer several advantages, including comprehensive coverage, consistent measurement, and reduced reporting bias relative to survey-based measures of parental engagement.

Methods

The empirical analysis examines whether changes in school competition are associated with changes in complaint rates across municipalities and over time. The authors estimate regression models that relate complaint frequency to measures of local school competition while controlling for demographic and institutional factors. The models also incorporate fixed effects that account for unobserved differences across municipalities and time periods. This approach allows the analysis to isolate the relationship between competition and complaint behavior while accounting for persistent differences between locations.

The empirical strategy exploits variation in the expansion of independent schools across municipalities. Some areas experienced substantial increases in independent school presence, while others saw relatively little change. By comparing trends in complaint behavior across these different environments, the authors estimate how competition influences parental voice. Additional specifications test the robustness of the results to alternative measures of competition and model structures.

Although the analysis employs careful controls and robustness checks, the design relies primarily on observational regression methods rather than randomized or quasi-experimental identification strategies. As a result, the estimates identify strong associations between competition and complaint behavior but cannot fully eliminate concerns about unobserved factors that may influence both variables. The statistical approach is nonetheless transparent and well aligned with the available administrative data.

Findings/Size Effects

The empirical results indicate a consistent relationship between increased school competition and reduced parental complaint activity. Municipalities experiencing greater growth in independent schools tend to show lower rates of formal complaints submitted to national regulators. The magnitude of this relationship is substantively meaningful. The authors estimate that a one-standard-deviation increase in local school competition leads to a decline in complaint rates of roughly 7 to 10 percent.

The findings are consistent across multiple specifications and robustness checks. Alternative measures of competition produce similar results, and the relationship persists when controlling for demographic characteristics and municipal fixed effects. These patterns suggest that the observed decline in complaint activity is systematically associated with the presence of competitive schooling options rather than idiosyncratic features of particular municipalities.

The results align with the theoretical prediction that exit opportunities can substitute for voice. When parents have greater ability to move their children to alternative schools, they may be less inclined to file complaints against their current school. Instead of attempting to reform an unsatisfactory institution through formal channels, they can simply switch providers. This behavioral response reflects a shift in how accountability operates within the education system.

The authors also examine whether the decline in complaints reflects broader changes in parental engagement or satisfaction. While the administrative data do not allow direct measurement of satisfaction, the pattern of results suggests that competition alters the mechanism through which dissatisfaction is expressed. Rather than using regulatory channels to address concerns, parents appear more likely to rely on exit as the primary response to perceived problems.

Conclusion

This article contributes to the literature on education markets by examining a dimension of competition that has received relatively little empirical attention. While previous research has focused primarily on academic outcomes, the authors demonstrate that competition also reshapes how parents interact with educational institutions and regulatory authorities. The decline in complaint activity associated with increased competition suggests that school choice reforms influence not only performance metrics but also the governance mechanisms through which citizens hold institutions accountable.

The findings have broader implications for the study of public service markets. When exit options expand, individuals may rely less on voice mechanisms that operate through formal oversight structures. This shift can alter the informational environment available to regulators and policymakers. Complaint systems often serve as early warning mechanisms for institutional problems, and changes in complaint behavior may therefore influence how oversight agencies detect and address issues within schools.

The Swedish context provides a valuable setting for examining these dynamics because the country’s voucher system generated substantial variation in competition across municipalities. At the same time, institutional differences between Sweden and other countries should be considered when interpreting the results. Regulatory structures, complaint procedures, and school governance arrangements vary widely across education systems. Nevertheless, the underlying behavioral mechanism identified in the study—the substitution of exit for voice—may apply broadly in contexts where parents have meaningful opportunities to change schools.

Methodologically, the article offers a careful empirical examination using comprehensive administrative data. Future research could further strengthen causal inference by employing quasi-experimental designs that exploit policy changes or institutional thresholds affecting school competition. Such approaches would provide additional evidence on whether the observed relationship reflects causal mechanisms rather than correlated trends. Even so, the article provides important empirical evidence on how competition influences citizen engagement within public institutions, expanding the scope of research on school choice beyond traditional measures of educational performance.